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Introduction 
While many factors will have contributed to the catastrophe at Grenfell Tower, it is clear that the 
structure itself behaved in a way that no one could possibly have intended. In this article the authors 
sample the bewildering and sometimes apparently contradictory directions provided by building 
regulations, and review how fire safety precautions, while seeming adequate on paper, can be 
undermined on contact with observed on-site practice.  
Main text 
The standards and regulations of the UK construction industry are highly regarded internationally 
but the Grenfell Tower fire has called into question the industry’s procedures, their enforcement and 
the quality of UK construction. The events of 14 June 2017 led to an unprecedented loss of life.  
Without second guessing the enquiry, there are some obvious problems: the external facing 
materials including the cladding combusted too easily, the fire spread rapidly both vertically, 
laterally and through the building, there was little resistance to the spread of fire and it was difficult 
to extinguish. Almost every aspect of the industry’s safeguarding regulations and procedures appear 
compromised or overlooked. With hundreds of buildings considered to be at risk and the many 
cladding systems now condemned, it is evident that the industry is either unaware of the regulations 
and standards that apply or is neglecting responsibility for fire safety. Questions must be answered 
and the tragedy of Grenfell must be acknowledged to restore confidence in industry standards and 
processes. 
With hindsight, we would require clarity on where site practices differed from the regulatory 
requirements. However, a review of the regulations is at best confusing and some parts of the 
Approved Documents are misleading. Without forensically picking apart the regulations and 
reassembling them into a more intelligible form, it is doubtful whether the parties were aware of 
what standards they should be building to. 
The Building Regulations with their schematics and practical statements use legal language when 
citing and cross-referencing supporting documents and standards. While general assumptions can be 
made, understanding the full implications of the approved documents requires access to reports and 
standards that may not be immediately available to most construction professionals. This is a real 
concern as building regulatory controls were set up for the industry, not lawyers, to ensure events 
such as Grenfell should not occur. Building regulations originated from a need to control the spread 
of fire; unsurprisingly, the London Building Act 1667 was introduced to avoid a repetition of the 
Great fire of 1666. This Act provided the basis for the initial regulations, with the overwhelming 
need to control the threat and spread of fire and smoke in buildings. However, building processes, 
products and legislative frameworks change and are always under review to ensure they safeguard 
occupants. The Grenfell fire has drawn attention to the fact that the regulations do not provide an 
intelligible message. Notwithstanding changes in building regulations, evidence from other recent 
events should have provided an impetus for change. The industry has become blind and in some 
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cases has ignored the lessons which should have been learned.  
While many factors will have contributed to the catastrophe at Grenfell Tower, it is obvious that the 
cladding and external insulation burned much more readily than many would have expected. The 
Building Regulations are clear on this point:  
“12.5. The external envelope of a building should not provide a medium for fire spread if it is likely 
to be a risk to health or safety. The use of combustible materials in the cladding system and 
extensive cavities may present such a risk in tall builds. External walls should either meet the 
guidance given in paragraphs 12.6 to 12.9 or meet the performance criteria given in the BRE report 
Fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multi storey buildings (BR 135 for 
claddings systems using full scale test data from BS 8414-1:2002 or BS 8414-2005).” 
While, Diagram 40, Approved Document B, vol. 2. “Provisions for external surfaces or walls” 
(DCLG, 2013) shows a set of drawings that includes the use of UK regulation Class O (a material or 
product which is non-combustible or material of limited combustibility), we are also mindful that 
paragraph 12.5 discusses the use of combustible materials and allows for use where tests have been 
undertaken and risk of fire spread is reduced. In the Building Regulations Diagram 40, Class O or 
the class B-s3, d2 or better can be used on buildings above 18 metres. It is worth noting that Class B 
refers to tests that limit the spread of fire (flames) under a limited exposure to flame attack. 
Under surface flame attack and, where required, edge flame attack (see 6.3) with 30 seconds 
exposure time, there shall be no flame spread in excess of 150 mm vertically from the point of 
application of the test flame within 60 s from the time of application BS EN 13501-1:2007 + 
A1:2009 (2009) p21, 11.6). 
In this paragraph no reference is made to non-combustible or limited combustibility and the sub-
classifications s3 allows unlimited smoke production and d2 is the lowest classification for fire 
droplets thus “…there is no limit set for smoke production and/or flaming droplets/particles” (BS 
EN 13501-1:2007 + A1:2009 (2009) p34).   
From a rather confused review of the regulations it would seem that Class O restricts materials to 
limited combustibility, above 18m, but the European Standard or British Standard European Norm 
(BS EN), given as an alternative, only limits the spread of flame for a relatively restricted period.  
There emerges a difference between materials that may satisfy the test and assemblies, and building 
conditions that could affect the health or safety of the occupants. 
From experience we know that combustible materials are a problem even when protected with a 
less flammable finish. Many investigations have been carried out to demonstrate what happens in a 
fire and how it develops. Particularly notable was the Dublin Stardust fire in 1981, and the BRE 
reconstruction. This reconstruction was set up as the seat coverings were shown to be combustion-
resistant but, when split, the underlying upholstery was not. In the reconstruction, with the carpet-
tile wall coverings, the fire developed with terrifying speed and became rapidly uncontrollable (this 
can be witnessed on you tube footage: “Stardust disco 1981”). In the actual fire 48 people lost their 
lives and in the fire reconstruction the speed with which it developed caught the research team by 
surprise, evidenced by their great haste in evacuating the open-sided test facility, which was totally 
engulfed within minutes. While Stardust was an internal fire, it was evident that once sufficient time 
is allowed for a small fire to develop and the radiative heat be reflected and channelled, combustible 
material in the vicinity can quickly ignite. The conditions of a building are often quite different 
from the laboratory tests.  
In the more recent Lakanal House disaster of 2009 fire originated from a faulty television on the 
ninth floor and spread unexpectedly quickly, both laterally and vertically, combusting the cladding 
and travelling between apartments. Specifically, the cladding, made up of composite panels in the 
window sets, was not required to be fire-resistant (Greater London Coroner’s court, 2013) which 
meant that the panels combusted within a few minutes. This was a refurbishment project, as was 
Grenfell, where a key question is whether the retrofit compromised the building’s fire safety. 
With retrofits or remediation it is even more important to ensure the installations and builders’ work 
do not compromise the building’s integrity and fire safety. In Lakanal, building defects, the lack of 
effective seals, fire stopping, and broken compartmentation contributed to the spread of fire and 
smoke and the ultimate death of six people. In 2017, Southwark Council pleaded guilty to four 
charges concerning breaches of safety regulations, incurring a £270,000 fine plus £300,000 costs. 
The enquiry showed that the lack of fire-resistant cladding was not among the counts for which they 
were culpable, however it was clear that the standards required were not sufficiently stringent.   
In a series of recent high-rise fires in Dubai, there occurred rapid fire spread up vertical faces 
through the polyurethane and aluminium cladding. Examples include the 82-storey Torch Tower, 
the 75-storey Sulafa Tower and the 63-storey The Address Downtown Dubai Tower. Of interest is 
that there were no fatalities in any of the buildings. In The Address building, the fire was presumed 
to have started with an electrical fault that spread through the window construction to the cladding, 
similar to Grenfel. The buildings were relatively new and the fire was contained, with damage 
restricted largely to the cladding. Thus, although such combustible cladding materials are 
questioned, where the passive integrity of the building is sustained the potential for safe evacuation 
can be maintained.  
The recent action to remove combustible cladding from tall buildings is clearly right. The Scottish 
Parliament acted more swiftly than England to ensure that external cladding “inhibited” fire 
spreading. The Building Regulations changes introduced in 2005 followed a fatal fire in a Scottish 
tower block in 1999. Following of Grenfell some changes to the regulations with regard to 
combustible materials in construction are likely, but the passage of fire across the face of the 
cladding and through the building was also a result of inadequate barriers and compartmentation. 
The quality of on-site construction and alteration is not adequately addressed in the Building 
Regulations. 
Photographs (e.architect, 2017) of the cladding system at Grenfell and some construction details 
around the windows raise important questions about the adequacy of fire barriers and stops at each 
floor and junction. In the real world, refurbishment and cladding retrofits can undermine fire safety 
design precautions. With retrofit projects, drawings can address “typical construction”, leaving the 
final “detailing” to the original structure’s irregularities and difficult junctions to the trades and 
those installing the cladding systems and fire barriers. It is crucial to be on guard against gaps 
between the insulation and main construction. 
 
Combustion, cladding and tower blocks 
There is much to learn from Grenfell. First we must remember that for combustion to occur we 
require fuel, a source of heat and a supply of oxygen. Fire testing can furnish useful data about 
whether or not material is combustible; heat produced by complete combustion per unit weight of 
material; speed of surface spread of flame; and chemicals produced and emitted during combustion. 
However, the application of fire test data to real situations is not a straightforward matter. Testing 
single samples of material can be limited in what it reveals and it is usually better to test materials 
in the combinations in which they are actually used. This is the philosophy behind the latest fire 
testing methods. The location and geometry of the material has an important bearing. In the case of 
Grenfell Tower, cladding and insulation material was applied to external vertical surfaces on a 67-
m-high building. 
Should any external material catch fire, the hot gases produced by combustion will rise due to 
natural buoyancy, thereby facilitating the rapid vertical spread of heat and flame. Behaviour of the 
hot gases passing over the surface is governed by the Navier-Stokes equation. Whenever a fluid – 
liquid or gas – contacts a solid surface, a boundary layer of fluid attaches itself to the solid. The 
forces of molecular attraction then ensure that any moving fluid layer will be drawn close to the 
surface: the external wall in the case of the Grenfell Tower. With intense heat close to the wall, any 
combustible material will be readily ignited. 
The most widely used principle of passive fire protection is that of compartmentation, that is, 
confining the fire to the room or enclosure of origin. Since smoke is the main killer in building fires, 
compartmentation should also prevent the spread of smoke. This strategy involves fitting fire doors 
to all rooms with the necessary fire endurance, usually at least 30 minutes. Such containment allows 
the occupants adequate time to escape. Windows represent an area of weakness as glass can shatter 
due to thermal shock. Equally, remedial builder’s works that do not leave effective seals will 
compromise compartmentation. If this happens there is then an opening produced through which 
hot gas and flame can exit. If this happens, it is essential that there is no combustible material on the 
outside of the building envelope, otherwise rapid vertical spread of flame will ensue.  
In Grenfell Tower, the insulation layer was fitted to the outer concrete wall, and there was an air gap 
between the insulation and the outermost aluminium panel. In this situation it is vitally important 
that any combustible material is protected from contact with heat or flame that may issue from a 
breached window opening. The method of doing this is fire stopping and, to be effective, it must be 
100% complete: even small gaps will enable the passage of flame and hot smoke. 
Insulation material necessarily has a very low thermal diffusivity and, if ignited, burning would be 
prolonged. Given the thickness of the layers of insulation applied to Grenfell Tower, the burning 
time would be measured in hours. Indeed, once alight, it would be difficult to extinguish and this 
was what was observed in this particular fire. The fire began in the middle of the night but was still 
well alight the next morning as the television news footage clearly showed. The combination of 
combustible material, an air gap and incomplete fire stopping proved to be fatal. 
In addition, experience with tall buildings in the USA has shown that active fire protection in the 
form of sprinkler systems are more effective in checking fire spread than the attendance of 
numerous fire engines. Providing that compartmentation measures and sprinklers are installed, then 
the advice to stay in your room would be sensible. In the Grenfell Tower, this advice was not 
appropriate. The Piper Alpha oil rig explosion and fire demonstrated that adherence to the 
instructions proved fatal; those who ignored it were saved and those who obeyed perished. If the 
circumstances of fire differ from those anticipated by the building designer, instructions on how to 
behave in a fire may be wrong. 
Fire deaths should be prevented by adherence to and enforcement of the Building Regulations 
pertaining to fire safety, and when it comes to fire stopping, attention to detail is all-important, as a 
small breach can prove to be fatal. With tall buildings, the ease with which flame can spread 
vertically makes it imperative that any insulation and cladding is absolutely non-combustible.    
There is much to learn from Grenfell and whole industry will be minded to adopt changes that do 
not let this happen again. 
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